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I. INTRODUCTION

Most articles and books that have been written on immigration policy start
from a utilitarian position. They discuss issues such as whether immigration,
on balance, is more harmful than beneficial, and whether allowing immigrants
into the country results in job losses, increases in welfare costs, aids in economic
growth, and so forth. This article is distinctly different in focus. Although
utilitarian themes are discussed, this article places the main emphasis on the
relationship between property rights and immigration policy.
Part two reviews the utilitarian arguments that have been made in
connection with immigration policy. Part three discusses the balancing of
interests argument, which attempts to arrive at solutions to immigration
problems by balancing the interests of immigrants with the interests of those
who are affected by immigration. Part four examines the public policy rationale
for placing restrictions on immigration. Part five applies property rights theory
to immigration policy. The article concludes that utilitarian approaches, which
include the balancing of interests argument, suffer from fatal defects, as does
the public policy argument. The real solution to immigration problems must
be found in a policy that recognizes and respects property rights.
II. A REVIEW OF THE UTILITARIAN APPROACHES TO IMMIGRATION POLICY

The vast majority of debates regarding immigration issues have been, at least
partially, from a utilitarian perspective. 2 Such debates revolve around

IRobert W. McGee is a professor in the W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton
Hall University in South Orange, New Jersey.
2

For a brief, scholarly overview of utilitarianism, see 8 THE
PHILOSOPHY 206-12 (1967).
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questions such as "who wins" and "who loses," "does the policy do more good
than harm," and so forth-basically variations of "the greatest good for the
greatest number" argument, which is utilitarian. 3 There is the perception that
immigrants will take jobs from citizens, that they will overburden public
services like education, health and welfare,4 crowd into the cities and generally
disrupt the status quo. 5 Businesses are burdened by having to comply with
laws that punish them for hiring illegal immigrants. 6 However, immigration
can be beneficial by allowing people with money 7 or skills 8 to enter the country,
thus making a contribution to the society they enter.9
Political leaders of the last few centuries have supported liberal immigration
policies on the ground that they enhance economic growth. 10 There is much
evidence to suggest that this is true. Immigrants to the United States have made
a disproportionate contribution to economic growth by bringing capital and
3 Newspaper

and magazine reports invariably discuss immigration issues from this
perspective, usually emphasizing who stands to lose rather than who stands to gain.
For a more scholarly approach that adopts this perspective, see Brian Adler & Brett
Jarrett, Capitalv. Labor: Who Wins and Who Loses Under the Immigration Act of 1990?, 23
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 789 (1992).
4For

a discussion of this point, see Kenneth H. Post, Excessive Demands on Healthand

Social Services: S. 19(1)(a)(ii) ImmigrationAct-What is the Standard to Sponsor Infirm and
Elderly Parents?,8 J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 142-77 (1992).
5Gary D. Thompson &Philip L. Martin, Immigration Reform and the Agricultural Labor
Force, 42 LAB. L. J. 528 (1991); Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Immigration Reform and the Urban
Labor Force, 42 LAB. L. J. 537 (1991).
6
For a discussion of the impact of the Immigration Act of 1990 on businesses, see
Timothy J.Horgan, The Immigration Act of 1990: Its Impact on the Business Community in
the United States, 64 N.Y. ST. B. J.32 (1992).
7
Bill Girdner, Give Me Your Rested, Your Wealthy..., 9 CAL. LAW. 41 (1989); Lawrence
C. Lee, The "Immigrant Entrepreneur"Provision of the Immigration Act of 1990: Is a Single
EntrepreneurCategory Sufficient?, 12 J.L. & COM. 147 (1992); Palma R. Yanni, Business
Investors: E-2 Nonimmigrants and EB-5 Immigrants, IMMIGR. BRIEF., Aug. 1992, at 1-35.
8 Robert E. Hopper, Immigration Issues
for Professional Nurses, IMMIGR. BRIEF., July
1991, at 1-43; Demetrios G.Papademetriou &B.Lindsay Lowell, Immigration Reform and

the Skill Shortage Issue, 42 LAB. L. J. 520 (1991); William V. Roebuck, Jr., The Move to
Employment-Based Immigration in the ImmigrationAct of 1990: Towards a New Definition of
"Immigrant",16 N.C. J.INT'L L. & COM. REG. 523 (1991); Robert D. Aronson, Immigration
Strategy and Practicefor Foreign Physicians, IMMIGR. BRIEF., 1991, at 1-30; Elizabeth A.
McGreary, The Reconciliation of Prominence and Exceptional Ability: A Necessary Step
Toward a CoordinatedImmigration Policy, 30 VA. J.INT'L L. 977 (1990).
9A

number of scholars have examined the economics of immigration. For example,

see INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION (London, 1970);
JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (1989) (immigration is

good for an economy); JULIAN L. SIMON, POPULATION MATTERS (1990) (the United States
benefits from immigrants); THE IMMIGRATION DILEMMA (Steven Globerman ed., 1992)
(immigration has had a positive effect on Canada's economy).
10

Thomas Muller, Immigration Policy and Economic Growth, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.

101,101 (1989).
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skills to a number of industries and occupations.1 They have built roads,
railroads and canals and filled the labor needs of American businesses.
Statistical studies are not needed to reach this conclusion. It may be done a
priori. The average immigrant who comes to the United States (or any other
country) must have extraordinary incentives. Otherwise, he or she would not
be willing to leave their homeland and relatives behind because doing so
involves great sacrifice. People who are willing to make such great sacrifices
can be expected to work hard and produce.
Yet at various times, including the period between 1882 and 1924, restrictions
were placed on the number of immigrants who could enter the country.12 A
discussison of the reasons for such restrictions goes beyond the scope of this
essay. But it can fairly be said that restrictions on immigration have a tendency
to reduce the rate of economic growth and cause other economic distortions. 13
When immigration is restricted there are winners and losers. Those who
work in high wage areas tend to benefit (at least in the short run) by
immigration restrictions because they can use the immigration laws to prevent
willing and able workers from coming into their labor market and bidding
down wage rates. However, those who live in low wage areas are not harmed
by immigration because people tend to emigrate from those areas. 14 The
foreign workers lose because their opportunities for employment are restricted.
The employers who might want to hire them are also harmed by restrictive
immigration policies, as are the consumers who might purchase the goods and
services that the immigrants would produce were they allowed to do so. Civil
liberties tend to be weakened because enforcing immigration laws gives the
government the excuse to snoop, sometimes without the benefit of due
process. 15 There are enforcement problems as well. 16
The argument has been made that immigrants overburden the public service
sector. For example, they use the public school system and partake of public
welfare benefits. While this may be true to a certain extent, it is also probably
true that they are less of a burden on society than the average American. Many
immigrants abhor being on welfare, whereas the average American does not.

11

MALDWYN A. JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 283 (1960).

12 For a discussion of the reasons for restrictions during this period, see JONES, supra
note 11, at 247-77.
13 Muller, supra note 10, at 106.
14

MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY

39-40 (1970).
15 Lisa A. DiPoala, ImmigrationReform and Control Act of 1986: A Licensefor Warrantless
Searches, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 817 (1989).
16Immigration Enforcement: Problems in Controllingthe Flow of Illegal Aliens Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Laurie E. Ekstrand, Associate
Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division) available
throughU.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/T-GGD-93-39.
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Immigrants tend to be younger than the general American population, and
thus are less of a burden on Medicare and Social Security than is the average
citizen. 17 Immigrants who work in the official sector (not the underground
economy) pay taxes, either directly or indirectly, to support the school system.
An argument can be made that this overburdening of the public service sector
can be prevented by prohibiting immigrants from partaking of these services,
but such arguments raise equal protection questions. Perhaps a better solution,
and one that has been suggested often in recent years, is to eliminate many of
the services presently provided by government by privatizing them. The
private sector can do a better job at a lower cost in practically every area of
government activity.1 8 The entire concept of the government having a role in
the redistribution of income through the welfare and tax systems is ethically
suspect as has been pointed out elsewhere. 19
Restrictions on immigration have other economic effects as well. 20 If
immigrants are allowed to flow into a community, there may be downward
pressure on wage rates21 because, as the supply of something increases, the
price tends to go down. But is that necessarily a bad result? If wage rates drop,
the cost of production also drops. This expands businesses' profit margins,
making it possible to plow back more profits into their businesses, thus
increasing the rate of expansion and making it possible to hire more workers.
Increased profit margins also enable businesses to lower prices, which benefits
consumers and the general public. It also makes American businesses better
able to compete internationally.

17Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Immigration and Private Property, in THE ECONOMICS OF
LIBERTY 216, 219 (Llewellyn H. Rockwell ed., 1990).
18For a number of studies that document this thesis, see RONALD S. LAUDER,
PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK: COMPETING FORA BETrER FUTURE, REPORT OF NEW YORK

STATE SENATE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION (1992); RANDALL FITZGERALD,
WHEN GOVERNMENT GOES PRIVATE: SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVES TO PUBUC SERVICES

(1988); PRIVATIZATION (John C. Goodman ed., 1985); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC

SECTOR How TO SHRINK GOVERNMENT (1982); JAMES T. BENNETT & MANUEL H. JOHNSON,
BETTER GOVERNMENT AT HALF THE PRICE: PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SERVICES

(1981); ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., CUTTING BACK CITY HALL (1980). All of these studies share
a common documented view that the private sector is capable of accomplishing nearly
anything in a more efficient manner than the government-and in some cases, in a
manner more than 50 percent cheaper.
19

BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1990).

20

For a critique of the effect the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 has
had on peace, prosperity and liberty, see Annelise Anderson, Immigration Policy, in
THINKING ABOUT AMERICA: THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990's 391 (Annelise Anderson
& Dennis L. Bark eds., 1988).
21There is evidence to suggest that the restriction of immigration puts upward
pressure on wage rates, at least in some industries and occupations. See BENJAMIN M.
ANDERSON, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE: A FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

OF THE UNITED STATES 1914-1946 87, 495-97 (1979).
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Another factor to consider is that immigrants not only add to the supply of
labor but they also increase the demand for goods and services. As demand
increases, so do sales, which in turn, increases the profits of the businesses in
the community. So having immigrants invade a community is also good for
business. As demand for goods and services increases, there is upward pressure
on wage rates, as employers have to hire additional personnel to handle the
increased demand for their products and services. As a result, the net effect on
wage rates for companies may be negligible. Further, if allowing immigrants
to invade a community results in an increased division of labor, economic
resources will be allocated more efficiently,22 increasing the general standard
of living. Therefore, from a utilitarian standpoint, allowing immigration may
be more beneficial than harmful to the vast majority of the domestic
population.
Attempts to justify on economic grounds the policy of restricting
immigration are... doomed from the outset. There cannot be the
slightest doubt that migration barriers diminish the productivity of
human labor. When... trade unions ... hinder immigration, they are
fighting not only against the interests of the workers of the rest of the
countries of the world, but also against the interests23of everyone else
in order to secure a special privilege for themselves.
Public choice economists call this use of the power of government in order
to feather one's own nest, at the expense of the general public, "rent-seeking".24
Rent-seeking behavior can be seen everywhere, from restricting immigration
to imposing tariffs and quotas on foreign-made products 25 and advocating the
passage of occupational licensure laws.26 Both the antitrust laws 27 and the
antidumping laws 28 are also good examples of rent-seeking behavior.
22

RoTHBARD, supra note

14, at 40.

23

LUDWIG VON MISES, THE FREE AND PROSPEROUS COMMONWEALTH 139 (1962). This
book was first published as LIBERALISMUS in Germany in 1927, and has been published
under different titles in a number of languages. For a detailed history of this book's
publication, see BETTINA BIEN GREAVES & ROBERT W. MCGEE, MISES: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY 14-15 (1993).
24

For expositions of the public choice rent-seeking thesis, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE

ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING (1989); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988); PUBLIC CHOICE (Julien Van Den
Broeck ed., 1988); GORDON TULLOCK, PRIVATE WANTS, PUBLIC MEANS (1987); TOWARDS

A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
25

ROBERT W. MCGEE, A TRADE POLICY FOR FREE SOCIETIES: THE CASE AGAINST
PROTECTIONISM (1994); JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991).
26S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF ExPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA
15-21 (1987); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1982); OCCUPATIONAL

LICENSURE AND REGULATION 13-25 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980).
27

DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY
F. SHUGHART II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROUP

FAILURE (2d ed. 1990); WILLIAM
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Much more could be said about the economic benefits and detriments of the
various immigration policies. The purpose of this essay is not to look at the
economic issues per se, but to look at the relationship between property rights
and immigration policy. Before such an analysis can be accomplished, it is first
necessary to discuss two arguments that have been put forth to restrict
immigration: the balancing of interests argument and the public policy
argument.
III. SHOULD THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS RATIONALE BE APPLIED TO
IMMIGRATION POLICY?
Justice William 0. Douglas has articulated one of the best arguments against
the use of the balancing of interests approach:
In recent years we have been departing, I think, from the theory of
government expressed in the First Amendment. We have too often
been "balancing" the right of speech and association against other
values in society to see if we, the judges, feel that a particular need is
more important than those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494,508-509; CommunicationsAss'n. v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382,399-400; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,463-466; Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 78-79; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
126-134; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,524; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365
U.S. 431; Konigsbergv. State Bar,366 U.S. 36; In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82.
This approach, which treats the commands of the First Amendment as
"no more than admonitions of moderation" (see Hand, The Sirit of
Liberty (1960 ed.), p. 278), runs counter to our prior decisions.
The balancing of interests argument has been applied in a number of
situations to determine both policy and law. 30 The argument is that the interests

POLmcs (1990); DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL
(1986).
28
Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
491 (1993).
29
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 270-271 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a
discussion by Justice Douglas of the right of association and the balancing test, see
William 0. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLuM. L. REV. 1361 (1963).
30
See generally American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
rehearingdenied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950) (regulating conduct in the interest of public order);
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (balancing community interests when determining
the constitutionality of local regulations); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976)
(balancing free expression rights against disruption); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768
(M.D. Ala. 1973) (balancing individuals rights against government interests); Joseph H.
Hart, Free Speech on Private Property-When Fundamental Rights Collide, 68 TEX. L. REV.
1469 (1990); Gordon G. Keyes, Health-Care Professionals with AIDS: The Risk of
TransmissionBalancedAgainst the Interestsof Professionalsand Institutions, 16 J.C.U.L. 589
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/10
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of one person or group must be balanced against the interests of another person
or group, or that the interests of one person or group must be balanced against
the interests of society in general. 3 1
This argument suffers from at least two fatal weaknesses. When the
argument is applied to balance the interests of an individual or group against
the interests of society, it must be pointed out that "society" has no interests,
only living, breathing individuals have interests. If one wants to determine
"society's" interests, one must resort to a surrogate. Society's interests can be
estimated by adding together the unique interests of the individuals who
comprise the particular society. The utilitarian argument, "the greatest good for
the greatest number," is an example of this approach being applied. But there
are several problems accompanying the application of the utilitarian approach.
For example, there is no sure way to measure how much someone or some
group is either helped or harmed by a certain policy. Economists use a surrogate
they refer to as "utils" to do this, but the use of utils is nothing more than an
arbitrary method of solving a problem that is basically incapable of solution.3 2
If Jane stands to lose five units of utility (utils) if a certain policy is implemented,
but James would gain eight utils of benefit, a utilitarian would conclude that
the policy should be adopted because the gains are larger than the losses. Of
course, there is no method by which it can be ascertained how Jane's negative
five utils or James' positive eight utils were determined. Such examples are
only practical in textbooks.
Policymakers may get around this problem by assuming that all affected
individuals have equal utility regarding various policies. 33 It then becomes a
matter of taking a head count. If 40 million people stand to gain as a result of
(1990); Sherry L. Evans, Casenote, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Balancing Employees'
Rights and Employers' Prerogatives: Allocation of the Burdens of Proof in a Title VII
Mixed-Motive Case, 43 Sw. L.J. 1149 (1990); Patricia B. Hodulik, ProhibitingDiscriminatory
Harassment by Regulating Student Speech: A Balancing of FirstAmendment and University
Interests, 16 J.C.U.L. 573 (1990); Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Three Ring Circus Revisited: The
Drift Back to Lochner Continues, 19 STETSON L. REV. 571 (1990); Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Three
Ring Circus: The Supreme Court Balances Interests, 18 STETSON L. REV. 301 (1989); Clare
H. Stebbing, Privacy Rights and Discovery Rights: An Emotional Scale to Balance in
AIDS-Related Litigation, 5 ADELPHIA L.J. 69 (1987); Ken Jennings & Melissa Clapp, A
Managerial Tightrope Balancing Harassed and Harassing Employees' Rights in Sexual
DiscriminationCases, 40 LAB. L. J. 756 (1989).
3

lid.

32

MuRRy N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 260-68 (1970).

33

Making this assumption simplifies the model but also makes it less realistic. In the
real world, different individuals place different values on various options, and the same
individuals place different values on identical options at different times. Consumers are
not identical. One consumer might place a value of 200 utils on a piece of cake whereas
another individual would value it at only 10 utils. One individual might value the first
piece of cake at 200 utils and the second piece at 150 utils because of the law of
diminishing marginal utility, which holds that utility decreases with additional
consumption. For more on this point, see WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN,
ECONOMICS 503-07 (2d ed. 1994).
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a certain policy, but only 500,000 people stand to lose, the policy should be
adopted because the gains resulting from the policy outweigh the losses. But
such an approach ignores the fact that some people might stand to gain a little
while others stand to lose a lot. If voters decide by a large majority to kill anyone
who has red hair, the majority may be served by killing them if the society's
population consists of only one percent redheads. The one percent who are
redheads, however, stand to lose a lot if such a policy is implemented.
The major flaw with using a utilitarian approach, of which the balancing of
interests argument is one example, is that a utilitarian approach ignores rights.
If only the interests of the majority are to be served, someone's rights will
occasionally (or frequently or always) have to be stepped on.
Another fatal weakness of the balancing of interests argument is that the
purpose of government is to protect rights, not interests. There is a difference
between rights and interests. While it is in the best interests of a 'mom and pop'
grocery store that a supermarket not open across the street, they have no right
to prevent the store from opening, since doing so would deprive the owner of
the supermarket from exercising his rights to property and contract. There is a
big difference between having rights violated and merely being harmed by the
activity of others. Competitors who cannot compete because consumers would
rather do business with the competition may suffer harm as the result of free
trade; however, no matter how great this harm, it does not give the ousted
competitors the right to prevent other businesses from selling to customers
who might otherwise be doing business with them.
There is confusion about terminology that warrants clarification. The main
confusion revolves around the concept of rights. There are two basic
conceptions of rights. The "negative" concept asserts that individuals have the
right not to be murdered, confined or robbed. These rights are inborn and may
also be stated in positive terms as the rights to life, liberty and property.
America's founding fathers, and others, have referred to these rights as
inalienable. Some would argue that these are the only legitimate rights,34
because they are the only rights that do not conflict with each other.
The other view of rights is the positive view. Positive rights are those granted
by the government. Advocates of positive rights assert that there exist rights
other than merely the rights to life, liberty and property. The problem with this
view is that, when rights are expanded to include more than just the rights to
life, liberty and property, "rights" can conflict. The negative rights of life, liberty
and property (one might also include contract and association to this list) can
never conflict. I have the right not to be murdered and so do you. We both have
the right not to be robbed. And we all have the right not to be confined.
When positive rights are asserted, though, there opens up the possibility of
conflicting rights. If one asserts that there is the right to a job, for example, such
an assertion necessarily implies that someone has the obligation to provide a
job. Some employer's property rights in its own business must be sacrificed so

34

See ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/10
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that another may claim this "right" to a job. When someone argues that there
is a right to "free" education, someone (the taxpayers) must foot the bill. When
someone claims that welfare is a right, then someone else's property must be
confiscated (taxed) to pay for it. One person gains at the expense of someone
else. Such rights are not really rights at all, but merely a grant by government
to live at the expense of another.
There is no right to a job if claiming the right restricts someone else's right.
So the argument that immigration should be restricted because a liberal
immigration policy "takes" jobs away from Americans does not hold up under
analysis. While it might be true that allowing cheap labor from Mexico or
elsewhere to enter the United States might cause some citizens to lose their jobs,
it does not follow that anyone's rights are being violated as a result. Employers
should be able to select those persons they want to employ. If a law prevents
such choice, then employers' rights to property, contract and association are
violated, as are the contract, property and association rights of the immigrant.
The confusion between "interests" and "rights" can result in policymakers
choosing incorrect policies. While citizen workers may have an interest in
keeping foreigners out of the country, they have no right to do so. Discussion
regarding "balancing" the interests of citizen workers against the interests of
immigrant workers focuses not on interests, but rights. Once it is realized that
the balancing of interests argument is just another positive rights argument,
35
the argument quickly falls apart.
IV. IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

Immigration is sometimes viewed from a public policy perspective.
Proponents and opponents debate whether a policy is in the public interest or
the national interest.3 6 But there can be no common good or common interest
because individuals have different interests.3 7 It is not possible to merely add
the interests of the individual citizens together because there is no way of
measuring such interests. Furthermore, a head count cannot be taken to
determine the nature of the public interest either, since doing so would violate
rights of some minority. If two wolves and one sheep vote on what they should
have for dinner, the sheep's interest (and rights) would likely have to be
sacrificed to the will of the majority under a public policy or balancing of
interests approach. The error in such an approach would not change if it were
a majority of a thousand wolves to a single sheep. There are cases where
majority opinion or interests have no place. Voting to have a sheep for lunch is
one such case, and restricting immigration is another.

35

See Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: ConstitutionalInterpretationand

Negative FirstAmendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987).
36

For a discussion from this perspective, see Pamela S. Cowan, Immigration Law,

Business and the NationalInterest: the New Debate, 43 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 6 (1989).
37

MICHAEL NOVAK, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 19-22 (1989).
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Since there is no such entity as "the public," since the public is merely
a number of individuals, any claimed or implied conflict of "the public
interest" with private interests means that the interests of some men
are to be sacrificed to the interests and wishes of others. Since the
concept is so conveniently undefinable, its use rests only on any given
to maintain
gang's ability to proclaim that "The
3 8 public, c'est moi"--and
the claim at the point of a gun.
[AIll "public interest" legislation (and any distribution of money taken
by force from some men for the unearned benefit of others) comes
down ultimately to the grant of an undefined undefinable,
non-objective, arbitrary power to some government officials.
The worst aspect of it is not that such a power can be used
dishonestly, but that it cannot be used honestly. The wisest man in the
world, with the purest integrity, cannot find a criterion for the just,
equitable,3 9rational application of an unjust, inequitable, irrational
principle.
The only way to resolve the immigration issue without violating anyone's
rights is to allow open immigration, since any other solution would violate the
rights of property, contract and association. Individuals must be free to pursue
their own interests as long as they do not do so at the expense of anyone else's
rights. Any governmentally imposed restriction of this movement or ability
violates rights.
The public policy argument is based on the false assumption that some
people should be able to impose their will on others as long as rights are not
violated. Those who advocate that immigration (or prostitution, ticket
scalping, dwarf tossing, painting one's house purple or other victimless crimes)
should be restricted want to use the force of government to accomplish
something that would be a crime if they committed it as individuals. If an
individual tried to prevent consenting adults from entering into a contract, that
person could be sued for interfering with contract, harassment, nuisance or
trespass. However, if the legislature passes a law that has the same result, then
somehow the interference is justified. Frederic Bastiat, the nineteenth century
French political philosopher, would argue that such actions would be the
illegitimate use of government power. His litmus test for the illegitimate use of
government power is as follows:
See if the law takes from some persons what belongs to them, and gives
it to other persons to whom it does not belong. See if the law benefits

38

AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 116 (1964); THE AYN RAND LEXICON:

OBJECIVISM FROM A TO Z 396 (Harry Binswanger ed., 1986) [hereinafter THE AYN RAND
LEXICON].
39

AYN RAND, CAPrrAuSM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 171 (1966); see also THE AYN RAND

LEXICON, supranote 38, at 396.
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one citizen at the expense of another by doing what the citizen himself
cannot do without committing a crime.4 °
V. A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO IMMIGRATION POLICY
An analysis of immigration policy that ignores the property rights issue is
seriously deficient. In fact, it might not be an overstatement to say that property
rights are the issue to be examined in any immigration policy. Utilitarian
arguments and the balancing of interests argument-which is utilitarian
based-suffer from fatal weaknesses, as does the public interest/public policy
argument.
The present immigration policy of the United States encroaches on a number
of freedoms, such as the right to travel41 and the right to marry.42 In addition,
there is the possibility that individuals will be denied entrance on the basis of
their associations, which violates the basic freedom of association. 43 Potential
immigrants must also watch what they say, since saying the wrong thing may
be cause for exclusion. 44 The main problem with the present policy, however,
is that it violates basic property and contract rights.

40FREDERIC BAsTIAT, THE LAw 21 (1968).
41

Most people concede that individuals have the right to leave a country if they do
not approve of its political system. A strong case would be the right of Jews to leave
Nazi Germany or the right of persecuted religious sects to leave a certain country when
staying would mean a high probability of death. Yet people are less than unanimous
regarding the existence of a right of entry. They recognize the right to leave one country,
but not the right to enter another country. See Suzanne McGrath Dale, Comment, The
Flying Dutchman Dichotomy: The International Right to Leave v. The Sovereign Right to
Exclude, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 359 (1991).
42
While it is possible for an immigrant to remain in the United States simply by
marrying a United States citizen, perceived "abuses" of this practice have led
government officials to pry into the reasons for such marriages. The result is that some
recently-married immigrants have been expelled notwithstanding their marriage to a
United States citizen. For more information on this point, see Nancy Whinnery,
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw--The ImmigrationMarriageFraudAmendments: Substantive
orProceduralProvisions?-Aziziv.
Thornburgh,908 F.2d 1130,64 TEMP. L. REV. 1081 (1991);
Kristin Garner, Comment, Immigration Law-Domestic Relations-Section 5 of the
Immigration MarriageFraudAmendments May Abridge the Fundamental Right To Marry,
Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 15 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 379 (1991); Kristi J.
Spiering, Comment, IrrebuttableExile under the ImmigrationMarriageFraudAmendments:
a Perspectivefrom the Eighth Amendment and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 58 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1397 (1990).
43
For more on this point, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership
and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (1990).
44
For more on this point, see Alexander Wohl, Note, Free Speech and the Right of Entry
into the United States: Legislation to Remedy the Ideological Exclusion Provisions of the
Immigrationand NaturalizationAct, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 443 (1989).
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The legal system treats property as a bundle of rights.45 One owns property
to the extent that one can utilize it as one sees fit. The body is the most basic
form of property.46 Once the government restricts what one can do with one's
own body, the government encroaches on property rights. If one cannot
transport one's body to the country of one's choice (immigration), rent it for
purposes of sex (prostitution 47 or surrogacy 48), use it to read what one wants
(censorship laws), say what is on one's mind 4 9 (freedom of speech-the vocal
cords are one's property), associate with whomever one wants for purposes of
marriage or companionship, then individual property rights are violated.
There is an argument that property rights are not absolute, and that they
must sometimes be restricted because restriction is in the public interest.
However, there is no such thing as the public interest because individuals have
different and conflicting interests; thus, the public interest argument does not
withstand analysis. As long as the rights of others are not violated, people
should be able to do whatever they want with their body, including ingesting

45

63A AM. JUR.2D Property§ 1 (1984).

46

John Locke has pointed out, 'Every man has a 'property' in his own 'person.' This
nobody has any right to but himself." JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL
GOVERNMENT Chap. V, 26 (1690). For a detailed account of Locke's views on property,
see Catherine Valcke, Locke on Property: A Deontological Interpretation, 12 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 941 (1989). Fora more modem treatment of the body as property, see RUSSELL
SCOTT,THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981).
And courts have said that "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body." Bouvia v. Superior Court,
179 Cal. App.3d 1127,1139,225 Cal. Rptr. 297,302 (2d Dist. 1986) (citations omitted).
47

1t has been argued that prostitution is a victimless crime. See WALTER BLOCK,

19-22 (1976); Note, CriminalLaw-The Principleof Harm
and its Application to Laws CriminalizingProstitution,51 DENVER L.J. 235 (1974) (where
there is no legal harm, there should be no crime). A utilitarian argument for the
legalization of prostitution rests on the premise that the costs of keeping it illegal are
too high. Marvin M. Moore, The Casefor Legitimizing the Call Girl, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 337
(1988); Julie Pearl, The Highest Paying Customers: America's Cities and the Cost of
ProstitutionControl, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1987).
DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE

48

Some legal theorists argue that surrogacy should be prohibited on public policy
grounds. See Robert D. Arenstein, Is Surrogacy Against Public Policy? The Answer Is Yes,
18 SETON HALL L. REV. 831 (1988). But this argument does not withstand analysis.
Surrogacy-the renting of one's womb for purposes of allowing a fetus to reach the
stage at which it can be born-is a win-win situation. Nobody loses. The natural parents
win because surrogacy enables them to have a baby they would not otherwise be able
to have. The surrogate wins because she is paid for her services. She may also receive a
psychic benefit as a result of her participation. And the baby benefits because it is given
the opportunity for life.
49

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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unhealthy food, selling body parts, 50 or donating them, either before or after
death. 51
Property rights theory can be applied to the problem of restricting
immigration. Individuals have a right to do with their bodies as they see fit to
the extent they do not violate the rights of others. However, they cannot place
their bodies on the property of another without the owner's permission. To do
so would be trespassing. So, although individuals have the freedom to travel,
they cannot go where they are not wanted. As Senator Alan K. Simpson has
said, "We must distinguish between the right to leave the Soviet Union and the
right to enter the United States."52 The "human right" to travel and immigrate
is limited in the sense that individuals cannot place their property (their bodies)
on the property of others unless the owners of such land do not object.
The immigration problem could be solved if all land were privately owned
because the landowners could decide who they want on their property and
they could exclude all others. 53 But this solution becomes complicated when
the government owns a large percentage of the land, as is the case in the United
States. The federal government owns nearly 61 percent of the land in California,
more than 67 percent of Alaska, and more than a third of Colorado. 54 Thus, the
federal government can legally restrict immigration by prohibiting foreigners
from setting foot on federal land. In fact, the government can (and does) go
even further, by also prohibiting foreigners from setting foot on privately
owned land. Shopping mall owners, landlords and numerous other groups
have their property and contract rights violated under present immigration
policy because the government prevents potential customers, tenants or
employees from entering onto their property. Business owners are prohibited
from hiring such foreigners. Such restrictions violate the business owners' right
to contract, as well as the rights of the foreigners who might want to do business
with (or work for) the business owners.

50

William D. Noonan, Ownership of Biological Tissue, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 109 (1990); Jennifer Lavoie, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents
of the University of California,75 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1989).
51For example, why should it be illegal to give away or sell one's kidneys, heart, bone
marrow, lungs, and so forth? Why should individuals not be allowed to sell their body
parts or give some parts to science, or allow the surviving spouse to sell one's cadaver?
For more on these points, see Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasingthe Supply of TransplantOrgans:
The Virtues of a FuturesMarket, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989); Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170

(1900) (holding that there is a law to the contrary in that there is no property in a dead
body, it is not part of the estate of the deceased person, and a man cannot by will dispose
of that which after death will become his corpse). Of course, one now can donate body
parts or even one's whole body to science, a hospital or some other group.
52
DOuG BANDOW, THE POLrrIcs OF PLUNDER: MISGOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON 457
(1990).
53

MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 119 (1982).

54

Doug McInnis, Higher GrazingFees Have Ranchers Running Scared, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 1993, at F5.
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By what right does the government of a territory proclaim the power
to keep other people away? Under a purely free-market system, only
individual property owners have the right to keep people off their
property. The government's power rests on the implicit assumption
that the government owns all the territory which it rules. Only then can
the government keep people out of that territory.55
Lew Rockwell sums up the property rights position as follows:
Our ultimate goal should be to make our country a network of private
neighborhoods. There is no right of public access on private property.
If commercial districts were like malls, and communities had access
restricted to the people the residents wanted-as some do today-we
would not have to worry about bums and felons infesting our streets,
nor about unwanted
immigrants ... Thatis the kind of society we ought
56
to work for.
The only immigration policy that does not violate individual rights is an
unrestricted immigration policy. Thus, it is the one that should be adopted. The
immigration "problem" can be solved by recognizing, enhancing and
protecting property rights and permitting consenting adults to enter into
contracts with whomever they want. The "problem" is not immigration; it is
the disparagement of property and contract rights.

5 5 ROT-IBARD,
5 6Rockwell,

supra note 14, at 60-61.
supra note 17, at 220.
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